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From Prometheus to Myriad to Classen, What a 
Messy Subject Matter: A Review on Recent Life 
Science Method Patent Cases 
By Rui Xu* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  A recent thread of Federal Circuit cases demonstrates the continuous struggle that 
courts have had applying § 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code, the subject matter 
patent-eligibility inquiry regarding life science method patent claims.  These cases 
suggest the inclination of, if not apparent desire by, the Federal Circuit to undercut the 
subject matter inquiry, rendering this traditionally significant patent law area muddier 
than ever.  While the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that broad categorical rules 
may not be advisable or even feasible for determining subject matter patent-eligibility, it 
has never suggested that subject matter inquiry lacks merit and should be forgone.  These 
recent cases reflect the confusion among courts about the Supreme Court ruling in Bilski 
v. Kappos,
1
 and leave unclear how patent applicants should proceed when drafting 
relevant claims, and which existing method claims remain viable.  The fine line between 
abstract processes (unpatentable) and specific applications of abstract processes 
(patentable) still proves to be elusive.  More clarification is desperately needed, 
especially considering the preemptive force such method patents hold over a wide range 
of uses of an abstract process. 
¶2  This Note begins in Part II by providing a historical review of the legal framework 
on § 101, and examining the machine-or-transformation test generally used by the courts 
to examine patent-eligibility.  Part III then focuses on the three most recent Federal 
Circuit cases in an attempt to decipher current standards of § 101 for life science method 
claims: Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services;
2
 Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (the “Myriad” case);3 and, 
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC.
4
  By examining the claims in these three 
cases, both patentable and unpatentable claims, this Note then delves into an analysis of 
the inconsistencies among the rulings and attempts to provide some unifying 
interpretations.  The Note then asks whether it was correct for the Court in Prometheus 
and the Federal Circuit in Myriad to treat changes in a biological body after treatment as 
equivalent to “transformation,” whether the Classen Court was well-advised to hold 
patentable for claims consisting of just a mental step and an action step, whether the 
Classen Court’s policy concerns are valid, and how significant the preemptive effects of 
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1
 130 S.Ct. 3218 (2010).  
2
 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
3
 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2011). 
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the broadening § 101 standard are.  Finally, this Note provides some practical guidance 
for drafting method claims in light of these recent rulings. 
II. 35 U.S.C. § 101 PATENT-ELIGIBILITY: A HISTORIC REVIEW 
¶3  The subject matter patent-eligibility of method claims is often evaluated under the 
machine-or-transformation test, which essentially renders a method patent-eligible if it is 
implemented with a particular machine to carry out the process, or transforms an article 
from one state or thing to another.  The Supreme Court has elaborated on the test in a 
long thread of cases, most recently in Bilski v. Kappos.
5
  However, the exact minimum 
requirements for satisfying the test remain undetermined.  In Bilski the Supreme Court 
held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the only test for patent eligibility, 
which leaves open other possibilities to satisfy the subject matter requirement of § 101. 
A. Machine-or-Transformation Test 
¶4  Section 101 of Title 35 U.S.C. sets out the subject matter that can be patented: 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”6  In discussing § 101, 
the Supreme Court has stated that its four categories—process, machine, manufacture, 
and composition of matter—encompass “anything under the sun that is made by man.”7 
¶5  In the 1980s, the Supreme Court upheld a series of method patent claims (also 
known as “process claims”),8 which led to a significant increase in patent applications 
related to new software, business methods, and medical diagnostic and therapeutic 
methods.
9
  Life science method patents have become particularly abundant and 
controversial in recent years, and their merits have been challenged in the Courts.
10
 
¶6  The classic test of patent-eligibility of method claims is the machine-or-
transformation test, which grants patent-eligibility to a process claim if it (1) is 
implemented with a particular machine specifically devised and adapted to carry out the 
process in a way that is not concededly conventional nor trivial; or else (2) transforms an 
article from one thing or state to another.
11
  The test has been articulated in a long line of 
cases, and most recently by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos.  In Bilski, the Court 
held the definition of process in § 100(b) to be sufficient,
12
 which defines process as a 
 
5
 130 S. Ct. at 3220-21.  
6
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). For an overview of § 101 patent-eligibility, see Efthimios Parasidis, A 
Uniform Framework for Patent-eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323 (2010). 
7
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
8
 “Process" usually refers to a manufacturing process, while a "method" usually refers to a way of using 
a product to accomplish a given result. 
9
 Margaret Kubick, An Uncertain Future: The Impact of Medical Process and Diagnostic Method 
Patents on Healthcare in the United States, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 280 (2010). 
10
 Id.  
11
 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 (2010); Stefania Fusco, "Is In re Bilski a Deja Vu?", 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
12
 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
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"process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
13
   
¶7  Bilski and its predecessors, such as Gottschalk v. Benson,14 leave unexplained what 
features of a “particular machine” and what forms and amounts of transformation are 
sufficient to grant patent-eligibility.
15
  The Court in Bilski suggested that the machine 
prong of the machine-or-transformation test remains uncertain.  The name “machine” 
might also be a narrow misnomer, as natural-principle processes can also be physically 
implemented not only with a machine, but also with an article of manufacture or 
composition of matter.
16
  While a process tied to a “particular machine” might be patent-
eligible, Parker v. Flook suggests that “inventive application of [natural] principle” may 
be patented too while “some inventive concept in its application” is essential.17 
¶8  On the transformation prong, with regard to the article to be transformed, the Bilski 
Court seemed to agree with the Federal Circuit’s opinion in In re Schrader that “the 
article” does not necessarily need to be a physical object, but could be a non-physical 
entity (e.g. electronic signal as in In re Schrader) representative of certain physical 
actions.
18
  However, “legal obligations, organizational relationships, and business risks” 
are not considered patentable “articles” but just “abstract constructs.”19  As to the 
necessary degree of transformation, the Supreme Court had held that insignificant extra-
solution activity, such as data gathering or outputting, will not transform an unpatentable 
principle into a patentable process.
20
  While a “substantial” physical or chemical change 
of properties material to the objectives of the method might be enough, the clear line to 
be drawn remains unclear. 
B. Machine-or-Transformation Test Not the Sole Test 
¶9  The Supreme Court, however, has held in Gottschalk v. Benson and Bilski v. 
Kappos that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for the patent-
eligibility of processes, but rather serves "a useful and important clue, an investigative 
tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101."
21
  The 
Court declined to adopt a categorical rule other than the well-established exceptions for 
 
13
 Id. at 3221; 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). 
14
 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
15
 See Fusco, supra note 11.  
16
 See, e.g., Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v. Richardson Merrell, Inc., 396 F.2d 70, 74 (3d Cir. 1968) 
(natural principle was not implemented with a machine but by coating an enzyme with an enteric coating—
either a composition of matter or an article of manufacture, or both). 
17
 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978). 
18
 See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
19
 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) aff'd but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218, 177 L. Ed. 2d 792 (U.S. 2010). 
20
 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-192 (1981) ("insignificant postsolution activity will not 
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process."); see also Parker, 437 U.S. at 590 ("The 
notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance.").  
21
 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 
(1972) (“It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must 
operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent 
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”). 
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laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas,
22
 and also held that “an 
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process 
may well be deserving of patent protection.”23  Nonetheless, a scientific principle cannot 
be made patentable by limiting its use to a particular technological environment or by 
adding insignificant post-solution activity.
24
 
¶10  The Bilski case centers on whether a method patent claims abstract processes 
(unpatentable) or specific applications (patentable), and expresses particular concerns 
about method patents that preempt all uses of an abstract process.
25
  Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court failed to provide any further guidance for the proper application of the 
machine-or-transformation test in a life science context.  In light of this decision, the 
Supreme Court first granted judicial review, vacated the decisions of the Federal Circuit, 
and remanded to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration both the Prometheus case and the 
Classen case.
26
  After the Federal Circuit’s second ruling, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari for the Prometheus case.
27
  Hopefully the Supreme Court will shed more light 
on this important issue, as more guidance on life science method claims is desperately 
needed.  Until then, however, the focus remains on understanding the three most recent 
Federal Circuit cases. 
III. RECENT LIFE SCIENCE METHOD CASES 
¶11  Since 2010, the Federal Circuit has ruled on three life science cases involving 
method claims.  They serve as the guiding authority of the current state of the courts’ 
standard for the § 101 subject matter inquiry.  We need to first conduct a thorough 
analysis of the three rulings individually before we can ascertain the current rules.  
A. Prometheus Labs v. Mayo Collaborative Services (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
¶12  In Prometheus, the method claims held patent-eligible by the Federal Circuit 
(Claim 1 of the ‘623 patent, Claim 1 of the ‘302 patent) constitute methods for 
determining the optimal drug dosage to treat specific diseases, by administering specific 
drugs and measuring the drugs’ specific metabolites.  They are applications of naturally 
occurring correlations between blood metabolite levels and drug efficacy.  These two 
method claims essentially consist of abstract descriptions of: (1) administering a drug (to 
a patient suffering immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder), (2) determining the level 
of the drug’s metabolites (in a patient’s bloodstream), and (3) such level would indicate 






 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
23
 Id. at 3230. 
24
 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981). 
25
 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253. 
26
 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (granting 
certiorari, vacating judgment); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d. 1057 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) vacated, 3541 (2010) (granting certiorari, vacating judgment).  
27
 132 S. Ct. 1289 (granting certiorari). 
28
 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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¶13  The Federal Circuit, in reversing the district court’s opinion, held that the 
"administering" and "determining" steps were both transformative, “not merely data-
gathering steps” nor “insignificant post-solution activity,” but were “part of treatment 
regimes.”29  The recitation of the transformative steps, as the Court held, was sufficient to 
satisfy the transformation prong of machine-or-transformation test.
30
  The Court stated 
that it is the chemical and physical changes in the human body that affords the process 
“transformation,” as it is “always transformative when a defined group of drugs is 
administered to a body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition,” since the 
drugs “necessarily [undergo] a transformation.”31  The transformation is the result of the 
physical administration of a drug to a subject to transform—i.e., treat—the subject, which 
is itself not a natural process.
32
  It seems that the Court is basing the patent-eligibility of 
such claims entirely on the fact that this administering step is not "natural processes" thus 
is “transformation.” 
¶14  The Court also held that although the final “warning step” is a mere mental step, 
and thus not patent-eligible per se, it does not by itself negate the transformative nature of 
the prior steps.
33
  Also, the claims do not preempt the broad use of a natural correlation, 
but rather recited specific treatment steps with specific drugs, which is a “particular 
application of the natural correlations.”34 
¶15  As for Claims 46 and 53 of the ‘623 patent which lack the administering step but 
contain only the determining step, the Court held that the determining step alone is 
transformative and determining the level of the drug’s metabolites (in the clinical samples 
taken from patents) is a subject that necessarily involves a transformation.
35
  Some form 
of manipulation or some other modification of the substances to be measured is necessary 
to extract the metabolites from a bodily sample and determine their concentration, which 
“is clearly a transformation.”36  The Court seems to be saying that as long as one exerts 
certain controls on or changes certain aspects of the article, one has satisfied the 
transformation prong.  
¶16  The Court distinguished the Prometheus claims from the principles enunciated in 
the Federal Circuit Court’s 1989 case In re Grams.  The method claim in that case was 
held patent-ineligible and involved (1) performing a clinical test on individuals and (2) 
based on the data from that test, determining if an abnormality existed and determining 
possible causes of any abnormality by using an algorithm.
37
  The Court in Prometheus 
noted that the process in Grams was unpatentable because “it was merely an algorithm 
combined with a data-gathering step” (performing a clinical test), and thus did not 
convert a patent-ineligible algorithm claim to a patent-eligible method claim.  The 
essence of the claimed process was the mathematical algorithm, rather than any 
transformation of the tested individuals.
38
  “If the steps of gathering and substituting 
 
29
 Id. at 1358.  
30
 Id. at 1355. 
31
 Id. at 1355-1356. 
32
 Id. at 1356. 
33
 Id. at 1358. 
34
 Id. at 1355. 
35




 In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1358. 
38
 In re Grams, 888 F.2d at 837. 
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values were sufficient on their own, every mathematical equation, formula, or algorithm 
having any practical use would be per se subject to patenting as a "process" under 
§ 101.”39  On the contrary, the process claims in Prometheus are part of treatment 
regimes for various diseases using certain drugs, thus not mere data gathering steps.  
However, as the Prometheus Court ruled that the determining step there is enough to 
satisfy transformation, the only difference between the two seems to be vague at best.  It 
seems that if one determines by using an algorithm, it is data-gathering; if one determines 
by using some form of modification or manipulation of the objects to be measured, it is 
transformation. 
B. AMP v. USPTO (Fed. Cir. 2011) (the “Myriad” case) 
¶17  In the Myriad case, the Federal Circuit held patent-eligible Myriad’s diagnostic 
method of screening potential cancer therapeutics by analyzing growth rates of cells with 
altered BRCA genes (very important breast cancer genes) in the presence or absence of 
the treatments (Claim 20 of the '282 patent).  Nonetheless, the court held another 
diagnostic method claim patent-ineligible, which consisted of “analyzing” BRCA gene 
sequences and “comparing” those with cancer-predisposing mutations to normal or wild-
type gene sequences (claim 1 of the '001 patent and claim 1 of the '999 patent).
40
 
¶18  In upholding the patent, the Court found that step (1) growing certain cells in the 
presence or absence of certain compounds (potential cancer therapeutic),and step (2) 
determining the rate of growth of cells in the presence and absence of the compounds 
serve as transformative steps, making the claim satisfy the machine-or-transformation 
test.  The other two steps are (3) comparing the growth rate of the groups of cells step, 
and (4) a “warning step” which states that “a slower rate of growth of said host cell in the 
presence of said compound is indicative of a cancer therapeutic.”41  The growing and 
determining steps largely resemble the two transformative steps in Prometheus, and are 
“inherently transformative step[s]” because they involve “the manipulation of the cells 
and their growth medium.”42  Also, these steps are central to the purpose of the claimed 
process, which is “to assess a compound's potential as a cancer therapeutic, and growing 
the cells and determining their growth rate is what achieves that goal.”43 
¶19  Regarding the rejected claims, the ‘001 patent constitutes a method for detecting a 
specific gene alteration, comprising a step of analyzing a sequence (of the gene or cDNA 
or RNA).
44
  The ‘999 patent claim is about a method for screening a tumor sample for a 
specific gene alteration, comprising a step of comparing sequences (DNA or RNA or 
cDNA) from said tumor sample with a second sequence from non-tumor sample, wherein 






 In re Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (citing In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
40
 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355-1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2011). 
41
 Id. at 1335.  
42
 Id. at 1357. 
43
 Id. at 1358. 
44
 Id. at 1334. 
45
 Id.  
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¶20  The Court invalidated both claims because the two patents did not recite 
affirmative steps for obtaining the sequences, and thus could be infringed “merely” by 
comparing or analyzing sequences.
46
  The Court held that they “recite[] nothing more 
than the abstract mental steps necessary to compare two different nucleotide 
sequences,”47 and “do not apply the step of comparing two nucleotide sequences in a 
process . . . [but] the step of comparing two DNA sequences is the entire process 
claimed.”48  Moreover, those terms' plain meanings do not include Myriad's proposed 
sample-processing steps; neither comparing nor analyzing means or implies “extracting” 
or “sequencing” DNA or otherwise “processing” a human sample.49 
¶21  The Court distinguished these two rejected claims from the patentable claims in the 
Prometheus case, which contained affirmative steps (“administering” and “determining”) 
that are transformative.  In contrast, Myriad’s claims do not include “determining” the 
sequence of genes, by e.g., isolating the genes from a blood sample and sequencing them, 
or any other necessarily transformative step.
50
  Rather, the comparison between the two 
sequences can be satisfied or infringed by "mere inspection" alone, therefore it 
encompasses merely an abstract idea or mental steps.
51
 
C. Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
¶22  In Classen, the challenged patents were based on Dr. Classen's discovery that “the 
schedule of infant immunization for infectious diseases can affect the later occurrence of 
chronic immune-mediated disorders . . . and that immunization should be conducted on 
the schedule that presents the lowest risk with respect to such disorders.”52  The three 
patents at issue generally related to methods of comparing information on immunization 
schedules with the occurrence of chronic disease and identifying an immunization 
schedule that might provide a lower risk of such disease.
53
 
¶23  The Court held that the claimed methods of immunizing a person in accordance 
with a lower-risk schedule (‘739 patent and ‘139 patent) to lower the risk of disease 
(chronic immune-mediated disorder) was eligible for patent protection.
54
  These method 
claims consisted of: (1) screening multiple schedules by identifying first and second 
patient population immunized with certain immunogens according to first and second 
immunization schedules; (2) comparing the effectiveness of said first and second 
 
46
 Id. at 1335-1356; See also Kevin E. Noonan, Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States 








 Id.  
50




 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Noonan, 
supra note 46; Jason Rantanen, Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen: The Broad, Broad Scope of Statutory 




 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1060. 
54
 Id. at 1060-61. 
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schedules; and (3) immunizing said patients according to a schedule with lower risk.
55
  
While such patents involve mental steps of reviewing the relevant literature to determine 
the lower-risk immunization schedule, like the Prometheus court, the Court here ruled 
that the presence of a mental step as part of the claimed process was not of itself fatal to 
patent-eligibility.
56
  The question is where the claimed methods fall on “the continuum 
from abstractness to specificity.”57  Here, it is the presence of the physical step of 
immunization that converted the otherwise unpatented abstract mental step to a “specific, 
tangible application.”58 
¶24  In contrast, the rejected method claim (‘283 patent) constituted a method of 
determining whether an immunization schedule affects a disease (chronic immune-
mediated disorder) in the treatment group compared to the control group, which 
comprises immunizing patients in the treatment group with immunogens according to an 
immunization schedule; and comparing the results (incidence, prevalence, frequency or 
severity of said disorders) in the treatment group and control group.
59
  This patent claim 
was held an abstract idea claim unfettered to any physical steps, and did not meet the 
threshold of patent-eligibility because the claimed process did not utilize the information 
derived from the claimed method for immunization purposes.
60
  The Court stated that the 
claims “do not include putting this knowledge to practical use, but are directed to the 
abstract principle that variation in immunization schedules may have consequences for 
certain diseases.”61  “In contrast, the claims of the ‘139 and ‘739 patents require the 
further act of immunization in accordance with a lower-risk schedule, thus moving from 
abstract scientific principle to specific application.”62  This comparison between the 
patents here strengthened the belief that the subsequent step of selecting an immunization 
schedule in the ‘139 claim was the bridge between an unpatentable abstract idea and a 
patentable process.   
¶25  The rejected patent states the idea of collecting and comparing known information, 
which is similar to Myriad which held that methods that “simply collect and compare 
data, without applying the data in a step of the overall method, may fail to traverse the 
§ 101 filter.”63  The “immunizing” in the rejected patent refers to the gathering of 
published data, while the immunizing of the ‘139 and ‘739 patent claims is the physical 
implementation of the mental step claimed in the ‘283 patent.64 
¶26  Compared to the rejected claims in this case, the claims upheld in Prometheus are 
for a method of controlling individualized dosages of a specific drug by measuring its 
metabolic products in the blood of individual patients, while the Classen patents operate 
on published information to determine general immunization schedules.
65
  The principles 





 Id. at 1065-66. 
57
 Id. at 1069. 
58
 Id. at 1066, 1081. 
59
 Id. at 1061. 
60
 Id. at 1083-184. 
61
 Id. at 1067. 
62
 Id. at 1067-68. 
63
 Id. at 1067. 
64
 Noonan, supra note 46.   
65
 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1068.  
Vol. 11:2] Rui Xu 
 129 
such transformative steps, but are not relevant to claims that require no more than 




D. Summary of the Three Cases 
¶27  The table below summarizes all the patent claims in the three cases.  A “full-
spectrum” life science method claim could potentially contain languages covering some 
information gathering steps (administering drugs/performing experiments, reading 
data/results, and comparing the treatment group and control group), and then some 
warning/indication languages based on the information thus acquired, and at last some 
way of putting the information into practical use.  
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‘623, Claim 1 
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Determine 
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 Id.; Noonan, supra note 64. 
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IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF RECENT RULINGS 
¶28  The Prometheus case and the Myriad case both held that the administering and 
determining steps are transformative.  The Classen court, however, rejected the first two 
similar steps and held that only the immunization step grants the claim transformation, as 
it serves as a step “putting information gathered to practical use,” a concept lacking in the 
two “transformative” steps in Prometheus and Myriad.  One plausible way to explain 
such discrepancy is to broaden the Classen’s principle to not only include claims that 
serve a practical function (Classen’s “putting information gathered to practical use”), but 
also that have the potential to serve a practical function (Prometheus’s and Myriad’s 
administering and determining steps).  However, such interpretation would loosen the 
subject matter patent-eligibility standard too much.  Also, the Court in Prometheus even 
held that the determining step per se is transformative, simply because the claim relates 
to biological changes in the body caused by the method.  In the Supreme Court’s 
dismissal of certiorari in LabCorp v. Metabolite Labs, Justice Breyer’s powerful dissent 
suggested that he believed such biological changes are ancillary at best, and do not 
separate the method from “natural phenomenon” to justify finding “transformation.” 
A. How to Justify the Discrepancy Between Classen and the Other Two Cases? 
¶29  The holding in Classen is very different from the principles elucidated in 
Prometheus and Myriad.  In Classen, the Court held that it is the final immunization step 
that by itself is distinguishing, while the prior information-gathering steps fail to 
constitute a “transformation.”  This means that it takes a step of “putting information 
gathered to practical use,” such as an active treatment step based on the information 
acquired, to separate patentable process from mental steps.
67
  If the claimed methods only 
culminate in information/data acquisition, and nothing more, they are unlikely to fit the 
requirement.
68
  However, the Prometheus case and the Myriad case suggest otherwise.  
None of the patentable claimed methods in these two cases involved any physical 
application/treatment that constitutes “putting information gathered to practical use.”  In 
the Prometheus case, after the administering and determining steps, the only words left 
are some warning/conclusion languages, which state that one can use the information 
thus gathered to adjust dosage accordingly to maximize efficacy.  If this final step 
vaguely conveys some minimum “practical use” application, the ‘282 patent claim in 
Myriad falls further short, as it only indicates that a slower rate (which is the information 
gathered) “is indicative of a cancer therapeutic.”  Moreover, the Prometheus and Myriad 
cases explicitly stated that the warning/indication step is not transformative, but it is the 
drug administration and/or drug level determination steps that are transformative, and 
determinative in separating abstract ideas from statutory process.  
¶30  However, considering the dispositive role the Classen Court gave on “putting 
information gathered to practical use,” another unifying interpretation for all these claims 
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could be that the process has to serve a practical function (Classen) or has the potential to 
serve a practical function (Prometheus and Myriad).  For example, as for the upheld 
claims in Prometheus, after the drug administration and drug blood metabolite level 
determination steps, and based on the drug blood metabolite level, the results of different 
drug metabolite levels provide us with the potential practical use of adjusting the dosage 
needed for optimal effectiveness.  On the other hand, the rejected claims in Myriad only 
serve to detect a gene alteration by analyzing gene sequences, or to screen a tumor 
sample for a gene alteration by comparing sequences from a tumor sample with those 
from a non-tumor sample, but nothing more to follow.  The rejected claim in Classen 
determines whether an immunization schedule affects a disease by immunizing patients 
in the treatment group with an immunization schedule and then comparing the results in 
the treatment group with the control group.  For the three rejected claims, the purpose of 
the claim is not for a practical use, and no reasonable follow-up practical use is possibly 
needed to attain the purpose of the process.  
¶31  Next, it seems that the consistent rule in all three cases is that it is the data reading 
step following experiment performance that is the deciding factor.  The determination 
steps held transformative in Prometheus and Myriad are comparable to the identifying 
steps in Classen’s patentable ‘739 and ‘139 claims, while missing in Myriad’s 
unpatentable ‘001 and ‘999 claims and Classen’s unpatentable ‘283 claims.  As a result, 
however, if that is the case, not only does it partly negate the majority’s reasoning in 
Classen, but it also loosens the subject matter eligibility requirement to a degree that it 
amounts to patenting the principle behind the experiments, as there are always ways to 
read data in the treatment group and the control group, so that we are essentially 
patenting the idea of administering such an experiment.  The administering and 
determining steps are necessary steps for any use of the natural phenomenon, which can 
be the scientific discovery of natural correlations in Prometheus, which means that since 
any use of the natural phenomenon would require the administration of the drug and 
determination of the concentration of the metabolite, the patent preempted the entire use 
of the natural phenomenon.”69 
B. Why Treatment and Data Reading are Transformative in  
Prometheus and Myriad? 
¶32  The logic behind treating experiments and data reading as “transformative” in 
Prometheus and Myriad is evasive and puzzling.  The only plausible explanation given 
by the Prometheus Court was that it is the chemical and physical changes in the human 
body accompanied by the experiment/drug administration that affords the process 
“transformation.”  However, many life science methods, if stated in proper languages, 
could involve some changes in the subject’s body due to the experiment or treatment, but 
it does not necessarily make the method “transform” the subject from one state to 
another.  Therefore, by equating performing experiments on subject with “transforming” 
the subject, the Court is opening the gate for a torrent of potential patenting abuse. 
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¶33  In Justice Breyer’s vigorous dissent (joined by Justices Stevens and Souter) to the 
Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari in LabCorp v. Metabolite Labs, a case involving 
a method claim (used to diagnose vitamin deficiencies) that resembled Prometheus' 
application in many respects,
70
 he undertook the analysis over method claims the 
Supreme Court had avoided.  The patent had two steps: (1) “assaying” a body fluid to 
determine what level of homocysteine (a type of amino acid) it contained, and (2) 
determining whether the level of homocysteine was above normal.
71
  Justice Breyer 
stated that the “correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency” in the claim is 
a “natural phenomenon,” and the claim is “not a process for transforming blood or other 
matter,” as the “transformation” simply “instructs the user to (1) obtain test results and 
(2) think about them.”72  Here, aside from the unpatented test, they embody only the 
correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency the researchers uncovered.
73
  
In Breyer's view, “to use virtually any natural phenomenon for virtually any useful 
purpose could well involve the use of empirical information obtained through an 
unpatented means that might have involved transforming matter.”74  Also, the dissent 
concluded that the claim effectively monopolizes the scientific correlation between the 
levels of homocysteine and vitamin B, and preempts the use of a natural phenomenon.
75
 
¶34  The LabCorp claim and the upheld claims in Prometheus and Myriad have striking 
similarities: all these claims center on determining a primary measurable fact/data point 
(the homocysteine levels in LabCorp, the metabolite levels in Prometheus, or the 
presence of a DNA mutation in Myriad), and that data point leads to a conclusion or the 
determination of a secondary non-measurable fact (the patient's metabolic state, the 
therapeutic potential of a pharmaceutical, or a patient's genetic susceptibility to cancer).
76
  
However, under the principle Justice Breyer laid out, the relationships between the 
primary and secondary facts in all these claims are actually unpatentable scientific 
correlations that are the results of natural biological phenomena.
77
  None of these claims, 
in their most general form, specifically require the use of a particular test method, or 
device, or machine. Such absence further suggests that the claims must be evaluated for 
impermissibly claiming natural phenomena.  Consequently, holding any knowledge of 
the primary fact, deliberately acquired or not, would potentially infringe the method 




¶35  However, despite the loose and yet inconsistent standards for transformation, it is 
certain that a method claim reciting only mental steps, without a transformation step of 
some sort, is not enough.  The cases suggest that for a step in the claim to be adequately 
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transformative, it should not be carried out by mere inspection, and the claim should 
recite some physical act or manipulation for a transformation to take place.
79
  Also, by 
tying or directly relating a physical step to the objectives of the process, a claim is less 
likely to be construed as only “data gathering.”80 
C. Why Mental Step is Out While in Classen Mental Step Plus Act Is? 
¶36  The Federal Circuit stated in Classen that a mental step element alone should not 
be dispositive.  Then how can merely coupling a mental step with an act make everything 
patentable?
81
  Such an act amounts to mere post-solution activity, as Judge Moore points 
out in her dissent, which does not transform the unpatentable fundamental scientific 
principle into a patentable process.
82
  The patentable claim in Classen was still essentially 
protecting all application based on the principle that a correlation exists between 
vaccination schedule for infectious disease and later occurrence of chronic immune 
diseases of all sorts and that immunization should be conducted on the schedule that 
presented the lowest risk with respect to such disorders.  While the idea and principle 
might be novel and useful, the process was a mere intuitive broad application of the idea.  
¶37  Judge Moore contends in her dissent that the majority gave “no consideration of the 
extent of preemption by these staggeringly broad and abstract claims” in this case, which 
included no specificity limitation for treatment steps, immunization schedules, “drugs,” 
“control groups,” or specific chronic immune disorders.83  She found that “it is hard to 
imagine broader claims . . . [or] a more conceptually abstract claim in the immunization 
area . . .  [and] Classen’s claims are directed to a thought apart from any concrete 
realities, specific objects or actual instances.  This is very much like patenting E=mc
2.”84 
¶38  It seems that the new rule in Classen provides clever drafters a range of weapons to 
make every method description sound patentable, as every process is simply a link in a 
longer process and one can just go a step further to couple the mental step with adequate 
act.
85
  Such interpretations might have lowered the § 101 eligibility bar too low, inviting 
patent lawyers to bring abstract methods within the realm of patentable subject matter 
simply by putting more perfunctory technical detail in the claims themselves.
86
 
D. Classen’s Policy Considerations 
¶39  In Classen, Judge Rader, joined by Judge Newman, expressed frustration with the 
rising number of § 101 challenges by accused infringers.  He stated it is difficult to 
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“invent” any category of subject matter that does not fit within the four classes 
acknowledged by Title 35: process, machine, article of manufacture, and composition of 
matter.  He stated that “eligibility restrictions usually engender a healthy dose of claim-
drafting ingenuity” resulting in evasions of subject matter exclusions, and such evasions 
“add to the cost and complexity of the patent system and may cause technology research 
to shift to countries where protection is not so difficult or expensive.”87  These policy 
concerns partly explain the loose eligibility standard the Federal Circuit applied in the 
recent cases, in that the Court wants to further discount the importance of careful drafting 
or formatting, thus giving 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty), § 103 (non-obviousness) and § 112 
(specification) more weight in deciding on patentability issues.  However, the Courts’ 
decisions will create a market satiated with abstractly drafted patents that are merely 
diagnosis, measurement, correlation, interpretation, or mentality.  
¶40  The majority’s policy justifications amount to an undercutting, if not a total 
neglect, of the traditional importance of subject matter patentability in the patent world.  
Even as the Supreme Court has suggested that a broad, all-inclusive categorical rule 
might be unfeasible, it has never discredited the subject matter inquiry.  As § 101 serves 
an important gate-keeping function, its regular challenges in patent disputes are expected, 
if not by design, and it should not be a policy reason to discredit such a legitimate 
statutory inquiry.  It is also hard to see in what way § 101 differs from § 102, § 103, and 
especially § 112 to deserve such a special treatment.
88
 
¶41  Moreover, the Court’s standard that what separates a mental step from patentable 
subject matter can be just an additional physical act defeats its own policy considerations.  
Now clever patent drafters need only look one step forward to be reassured, by linking 
the idea/principle/theory with some act to make the claim patentable, which, contrarily, 
incentivizes costly legal design-arounds. 
E. Potential Outcomes Due to Preemption 
¶42  We need to note the far-reaching repercussions of the over-broadening granting of 
subject matter patent-eligibility in the medical world, as life science method patents have 
direct impacts on patient care.  As Mayo Clinic contended in Prometheus, with 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals industries being granted exclusive private ownership 
of scientific observation, physicians might be held liable for patent infringement simply 
for receiving information of the metabolite correlations, regardless of what those doctors 
did with the information after they received it
89—suggesting that “mere thought” would 
become actionable, carrying the threat of sanctions including actual and treble damages.
90
  
For example, a physician would infringe the Prometheus patent anytime the physician, 
having ordered and administered thiopurine drugs to a patient, measured the levels of 
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¶43  Also, the significantly broad language in Classen’s upheld claim would end up 
preempting the entire immunization field from considering any two schedules prior to 
immunizing any patient with any drug for any treatment.  This claim expresses nothing 
but a broad way to apply a fundamental epidemiology principle, not only easy to apply 
but also intuitive in nature.  Most investigations on immunization schedules relevant to 
chronic immune disorders would essentially infringe such patents: a doctor might 
compare a patient’s outcome to those of other patients’ and then immunize according to 
the least-risky schedule known to him.  
¶44  The resulting increase in litigation would not only strain the physicians' financial 
resources, increase health care costs, but would also take time away from what they were 
supposed to be doing—practicing medicine,92 and decrease treatment effectiveness as it 
interferes with the doctors' ability “to make informed treatment decisions based on the 
latest scientific knowledge.”93  Customers may encounter similar problems of access and 
cost, as the prices of medical care may rise as a result of the expensive licensing, and 
critical care may be delayed or even abandoned because a single inventor has 
monopolized the tools for adequate care.
94
 
V. STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE TIPS FOLLOWING THE RECENT CASES 
¶45  These recent decisions suggest that the courts are leaning toward a more liberal 
interpretation of the “transformative steps” and more lenient view of patent-eligible 
subject matter.  It is still not clear what specific recited steps are the minimum 
requirements for patent-eligibility.  Therefore, patent applicants would be well-advised to 
expound on all practical applications and physical steps in the method patent application 
that might be used to explain that the invention is a practical application but not an 
abstract idea.  Below are several practice tips that might better facilitate patent applicants 
in securing their life science method patents:   
 
1)  Transformative Step: Drafters of method claims should explicitly recite at least 
one active, physical, preferably technology-dependent “transformative” step 
associated with the process.  Such practical use or active procedure could be 
adjusting the dosage, performing a procedure, administering a drug, isolating 
and/or purifying a sample, determining a sequence, or detecting certain features.
95
  
It is even better to draft claims that clearly show how physical objects are 
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2)  Machines: As appropriate, patent application should couple the steps with specific 
equipments/machines/devices, for example, by describing in the specification the 
particular equipments/machines/devices that can perform the operations of the 
processes, and providing multiple examples and embodiments in the 
specification.
97
  The essence is to make claims appear not too abstract but 
practical to minimize the likelihood that the invention will be characterized as 
merely an “abstract idea.” 
3)  End Result Step: It is also a good idea to “includ[e] at least one end result step that 
follow an analysis or comparison, e.g., adjusting a dosage or treatment 
protocol.”98 
4)  Warning Language: When no practical use or procedure is reasonable or possible 
given the purpose of the claim, try to have at least some indication/warning 
language suggesting the conclusion of the process, from which some potential use 
is reasonably foreseeable. 
5)  Purpose Language: The Prometheus Court seemed to suggest that the purpose 
languages in the specification and preambles of the asserted patent claims, which 
indicated the invention’s purpose to treat the human body,99 helped reinforce the 
“transformative” nature of the process.  Therefore, when the process serves or has 
the potential to serve a practical purpose, state such a purpose in the specification 
and preambles. 
6)  Single Infringer: In drafting process claims, it is better to avoid a joint 
infringement situation wherever possible.  Therefore, it is advisable to try to 
provide claims that are likely to be infringed by a single infringer, or recite steps 
that will be directed by a single entity. 
7)  Reissue Application: Existing patent holders might consider filing a reissue 
application if concerned about the continued validity of their patents.  They can 
add or amend claims to recite additional features (such as what step 1-5 suggest) 
to support patent-eligibility.
100
  Federal Circuit decision in In Re Tanaka held that 





¶46  The three recent Federal Circuit life science method patent cases on § 101 subject 
matter eligibility largely demonstrate that courts have been grappling with this 
fundamental concept and illustrate the inconsistencies or even contradictions in the 
rulings.  The necessary condition for steps in a claim to satisfy “transformation” is 
evasive.  There is a strong need for the courts to strike a balance between encouraging 
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innovations by granting patents, and being cautious to not overly broaden the standards 
for patent-eligibility. § 101 inquiry serves as the first gate-keeping function, and thus a 
unifying set of standards is in dire need.   
¶47  With the new development in fields such as whole-genome sequencing and 
personalized medicine, life science diagnostic and therapeutic method patents that cover 
some fundamental scientific relationships, principles, or correlations have the potential of 
impermissibly preempting the utilization and application of most basic principles and 
knowledge.  Considering the sharp contrast between the formal silence of the Supreme 
Court on the § 101 issue in LabCorp v. Metabolite and the forcible dissent from Justice 
Breyer which would cast serious doubt on the validity of the upheld patents in 
Prometheus, Myriad, and Classen, hopefully the Supreme Court’s upcoming hearing of 
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